09/29/2026
A physician group misses its RVU targets for a third straight quarter. Leadership schedules a meeting about engagement and accountability. No one revisits the compensation plan itself.
๐โ๐ฆ๐ ๐๐๐๐๐ ๐๐๐๐๐ข๐๐ก๐๐ฃ๐๐ก๐ฆ ๐๐๐๐ ๐๐๐ ๐๐๐๐๐๐ฆ ๐๐ ๐๐๐๐๐๐๐๐๐๐ก ๐๐๐๐๐๐๐.
They are an operating model problem, physicians are responding rationally to the incentive architecture they were given.
๐
๐ข๐ฏ๐ ๐ฉ๐๐ญ๐ญ๐๐ซ๐ง๐ฌ ๐ซ๐๐๐ฎ๐ซ ๐๐๐ซ๐จ๐ฌ๐ฌ ๐ฌ๐ฒ๐ฌ๐ญ๐๐ฆ๐ฌ ๐ฐ๐ข๐ญ๐ก ๐ฉ๐ก๐ฒ๐ฌ๐ข๐๐ข๐๐ง ๐ฉ๐ซ๐จ๐๐ฎ๐๐ญ๐ข๐ฏ๐ข๐ญ๐ฒ ๐๐ซ๐ข๐๐ญ๐ข๐จ๐ง:
โ Physicians are paid on individual RVU production while being asked to deliver team-based, protocol-driven care.
โ Call coverage stipends haven't been repriced as patient acuity and call frequency have climbed. โ Quality and value-based incentives make up a small fraction of total compensation relative to production incentives.
โ New physicians are onboarded onto legacy comp plans built for a service line mix that no longer reflects current strategy. โ Comp plan governance sits entirely with finance, with no standing physician input on design.
None of these are physician attitude problems.
All of them are comp architecture choices that were made, or never revisited, independent of how care is actually being asked to be delivered.
Systems that close this gap bring physicians into comp design from the start, price call and quality participation to reflect real demands, and revisit the plan every time service line strategy shifts.
๐ฉ Start the conversation: link in bio.